{"id":4468,"date":"2020-11-16T06:36:30","date_gmt":"2020-11-16T03:36:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/yeni.assam.org.tr\/index.php\/2020\/11\/16\/israil-stratejisinde-somali-ve-afrika-boynuzu-en\/"},"modified":"2020-11-16T06:36:30","modified_gmt":"2020-11-16T03:36:30","slug":"israil-stratejisinde-somali-ve-afrika-boynuzu-en","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/assam.org.tr\/en\/israil-stratejisinde-somali-ve-afrika-boynuzu-en\/","title":{"rendered":"Somalia and the Horn of Africa in Israel Strategy"},"content":{"rendered":"

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Somali, Afrika Boynuzu b\u00f6lgesini olu\u015fturan ana \u00fclkelerden biridir ve bu da onu \u0130srail\u2019in Afrika politikas\u0131 ba\u011flam\u0131nda \u00f6nemli bir \u00fclke yapmaktad\u0131r. Orta Do\u011fu’daki petrol yataklar\u0131na yak\u0131nl\u0131k, Aden K\u00f6rfezi ve Hint Okyanusu bakan konumu, K\u0131z\u0131ldeniz ve S\u00fcvey\u015f Kanal\u0131na giden yol olan Bab al-Mandab Bo\u011faz\u0131’n\u0131n g\u00fcney giri\u015fini kontrol\u00fc Afrika Boynuzunun \u00f6nemini art\u0131ran fakt\u00f6rlerdendir. Bu benzersiz stratejik \u00f6zellikleri nedeniyle b\u00f6lge, b\u00f6lgesel ve uluslararas\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7lerin ilgi oda\u011f\u0131d\u0131r.<\/span><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\u0130srail’in Somali ile diplomatik ili\u015fki kurma ve onunla \u00e7e\u015fitli alanlarda ili\u015fkilerini normalle\u015ftirme y\u00f6n\u00fcndeki pek \u00e7ok giri\u015fimine ra\u011fmen, bir noktada korsanl\u0131k olgusu ve \u0130srail’in d\u00fc\u015fmanca bir hareket olarak g\u00f6rd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc AL-SHABAAB hareketinin ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131 gibi g\u00fcvenlik de\u011fi\u015fkenleri \u0130srail’in bu giri\u015fimlerini ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131z k\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Ancak bu giri\u015fimler \u0130srail ile Somali’yi \u00e7evreleyen b\u00f6lge \u00fclkeleri aras\u0131ndaki bir\u00e7ok g\u00fcvenlik anla\u015fmas\u0131 ve g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmenin sebebi olmu\u015ftur.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u0130srail ve Somali Devleti<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\u0130srail’in d\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131, Somali\u2019nin ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k s\u00fcreci ile \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fc aras\u0131ndaki d\u00f6nemde \u00e7eli\u015fkili g\u00f6r\u00fcnmekteydi ancak en nihayetinde Somali ile normalle\u015fme hedefine havu\u00e7 ve sopa (carrot and stick method)<\/strong> y\u00f6ntemiyle ula\u015fmay\u0131 hedefliyordu.<\/span><\/p>\n

Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k D\u00f6nemi<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\u0130srail\u2019in Afrika’ya y\u00f6nelik politikas\u0131nda tarihsel s\u00fcrecin seyri \u00fczerinden \u00f6n g\u00f6r\u00fcde bulunma stratejisi \u00f6nemlidir. Bu minvalde, 14 Ocak 1958’de \u0130srail D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakan\u0131 Golda Meir’in \u00f6nc\u00fcl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcnde yeni alanlara girme ve kazanma f\u0131rsatlar\u0131n\u0131 de\u011ferlendirmeye dayal\u0131 bir strateji resmen onaylanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu s\u0131rada Afrika\u2019da ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011fa ula\u015fmaya yak\u0131n olan bir \u00e7ok \u00fclke vard\u0131.[1]<\/a>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Bu stratejiye g\u00f6re Golda Meir, Somali’nin s\u00f6m\u00fcrgecili\u011fe kar\u015f\u0131 direni\u015finin liderleri aras\u0131nda olan Mohamed Geo<\/strong> ile Somali ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 kazanmadan \u00f6nce 1959’da bir araya geldi ve ona ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k kazand\u0131ktan sonra \u0130srail\u2019den Somali\u2019ye ekonomik yard\u0131mlar g\u00f6nderilmesi teklifini sundu.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

6 Haziran 1960\u2019da \u0130srail Askeri \u0130stihbarat Operasyon Ajanlar\u0131 Birimi Direkt\u00f6r\u00fc Rahim Taymour, Somali Ba\u015fbakan\u0131 Abdullah Issa ve Muhammed Geo ile ileti\u015fime ge\u00e7ti<\/strong> ve onlara \u0130srail’in ekonomik teklifini tekrarlad\u0131.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131ktan sonra, \u0130srail Ba\u015fbakan\u0131 Yitzhak Ben Zeevi Somali’nin ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ve \u0130srail’in Somali Cumhuriyeti’ni tan\u0131mas\u0131n\u0131 kutlayan bir mektubu Somali h\u00fck\u00fcmetine g\u00f6ndermi\u015ftir ancak bu mektup Somali H\u00fck\u00fcmeti taraf\u0131ndan g\u00f6rmezden gelinmi\u015ftir. \u00dcstelik Somali \u0130srail’e d\u00fc\u015fmanca milliyet\u00e7i bir \u00e7izgi benimsemi\u015ftir ve Arap Ligi’ne kat\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/strong> Bu da Siyonist varl\u0131\u011f\u0131n bu yeni devlete d\u00fc\u015fman olmas\u0131na ve Etiyopya ile ili\u015fkilerini g\u00fc\u00e7lendirmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmas\u0131na neden olmu\u015ftur.<\/span><\/p>\n

Etiyopya ve Somali Sava\u015f\u0131<\/strong>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 yeni kazanm\u0131\u015f olan Somali Devleti, \u0130ngiltere’nin 24 Eyl\u00fcl 1948’de Etiyopya’ya b\u0131rakt\u0131\u011f\u0131 Bat\u0131 Somali b\u00f6lgesi nedeniyle Etiyopya ile bir dizi sorun ya\u015fam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/strong> Mevcut b\u00f6lgesel ko\u015fullar\u0131 oldu\u011fu gibi koruma ve s\u00fcrd\u00fcrme politikas\u0131n\u0131 tan\u0131mayan Somalili milliyet\u00e7i duygular Etiyopya-Somali ili\u015fkilerinin bozulmas\u0131na neden olmu\u015ftur.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Daha sonra M\u0131s\u0131r, Somali’yi Bat\u0131 Somali b\u00f6lgesi konusunda desteklemi\u015f ve bu karar M\u0131s\u0131r-Somali yak\u0131nla\u015fmas\u0131na yol a\u00e7m\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu yak\u0131nla\u015fma Etiyopya \u0130mparatoru Haile Selassie’yi endi\u015felendirmi\u015f ve buna kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131k \u0130srail’den askeri yard\u0131m istediklerinde, bu talep hemen kar\u015f\u0131lanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.[2]<\/a>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Bu s\u00fcre\u00e7te Ogaden b\u00f6lgesinde 1977-1978 y\u0131llar\u0131 aras\u0131nda Etiyopya ile Somali aras\u0131nda silahl\u0131 bir \u00e7at\u0131\u015fma \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131\u011f\u0131nda \u0130srail\u2019in Ogaden’in ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131na ba\u011flad\u0131\u011f\u0131 tek bir sonu\u00e7 vard\u0131: Bu b\u00f6lge ka\u00e7\u0131n\u0131lmaz olarak Somali’ye kat\u0131lacakt\u0131 ve bu “d\u00fc\u015fman” i\u00e7in daha fazla g\u00fc\u00e7 anlam\u0131na geliyordu.[3]<\/a> <\/span><\/p>\n

\u0130srail\u2019in Somali’ye kar\u015f\u0131 Etiyopya ordusuna deste\u011fini artt\u0131rmas\u0131 s\u00fcrecinde Etiyopya’ya fahi\u015f fiyatlarla satt\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u00fcr\u00fcnler aras\u0131nda ABD sava\u015f u\u00e7aklar\u0131 (F-5) i\u00e7in \u00f6nemli yedek par\u00e7alar vard\u0131 ve de bu u\u00e7aklar\u0131 \u0130srailli teknisyenler tamir etmi\u015ftir. T\u00fcm bunlar Etiyopya Hava Kuvvetleri\u2019nin Somali ordusunun silahlanmadaki \u00fcst\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc kar\u015f\u0131layabilmesini sa\u011flad\u0131. Ayr\u0131ca \u0130srail karadan havaya f\u00fcze \u00fcretebilmek ve F-5\u2019leri geli\u015ftirebilmek i\u00e7in \u00f6zel bir \u00fcretim hatt\u0131 kurmu\u015ftur. B\u00f6ylece Etiyopya Hava Kuvvetlerinin Ogaden’deki Somali z\u0131rhl\u0131 ara\u00e7lar\u0131n\u0131 daha etkin bir \u015fekilde imha edebilmesi sa\u011fland\u0131.[4]<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Somali’deki \u0130\u00e7 \u00c7at\u0131\u015fmalar D\u00f6neminde \u0130srail Etkisi<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Afrika \u00fclkesindeki i\u00e7 sava\u015flar \u0130srail\u2019in etkisini g\u00fc\u00e7lendirmek i\u00e7in her zaman uygun bir ortam sa\u011flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bunun \u00f6rne\u011fi \u0130srail’in G\u00fcney Sudan Devleti\u2019nin ayr\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131na destek vermesidir. Ancak Somali\u2019nin durumu, t\u00fcm devlet kurumlar\u0131n\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6kmesi ve temel i\u015flevlerinin; \u00f6zellikle de g\u00fcvenlik i\u015flevlerinin kaybedilmesi nedeniyle daha karma\u015f\u0131k hale gelmi\u015ftir ve bu da \u0130srail’in Somali i\u00e7indeki etkisini g\u00fc\u00e7lendirmesini sa\u011flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Ancak Somali kurumlar\u0131n\u0131 yeniden in\u015fa ederken bu etkinin zay\u0131flad\u0131\u011f\u0131 s\u00f6ylenebilir.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u0130\u00e7 \u00c7at\u0131\u015fmalar D\u00f6nemi<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

1991’de Siyad Barre h\u00fck\u00fcmetinin d\u00fc\u015fmesi ve devlet kurumlar\u0131n\u0131n hizmet d\u0131\u015f\u0131 kalmas\u0131n\u0131n ard\u0131ndan Somali’de \u00e7e\u015fitli partiler, a\u015firetler ve klanlar aras\u0131nda bir iktidar m\u00fccadelesi meydana gelmi\u015ftir ve bu da daha sonra devletin \u00e7\u00f6kmesine yol a\u00e7an bir i\u00e7 sava\u015fa d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015fm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr. Bu s\u00fcre\u00e7 \u0130srail a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan da Somali’ye girmek i\u00e7in elveri\u015fli ko\u015fullar\u0131 olu\u015fturmu\u015f ve \u0130srail bu amaca ula\u015fmak i\u00e7in iki strateji kullanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r: Ticari faaliyetlerin yo\u011funla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 ve \u00e7at\u0131\u015fman\u0131n baz\u0131 taraflar\u0131n\u0131n di\u011fer taraflara kar\u015f\u0131 desteklenmesi.<\/strong>[5]<\/a>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

MOSSAD\u2019\u0131n bu stratejilerin[6]<\/a> uygulanmas\u0131nda \u00f6zellikle Somali’ye askeri malzemelerin sa\u011flanmas\u0131yla ilgilenen Hollandal\u0131 \u015firketlerin kisvesi alt\u0131nda faaliyet g\u00f6steren uluslararas\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7lerin kamplar\u0131nda kendisine ba\u011fl\u0131 unsurlar\u0131n varl\u0131\u011f\u0131na ili\u015fkin raporlar\u0131n yay\u0131nlanmas\u0131ndan sonra \u00f6nc\u00fc oldu\u011fu ortaya \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Bu s\u00fcre\u00e7te MOSSAD ile g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc ba\u011flar\u0131 olan Avustralyal\u0131 bir Yahudi olan David Morse ismi ortaya \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015f ve faaliyetleri 1992 y\u0131l\u0131nda uluslararas\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7lerin Somali’ye girmesiyle ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Morse siyasi ve ticari \u00e7evrelerle ileti\u015fim kurma ve n\u00fcfuz etme konusundaki geni\u015f becerisi ile \u00f6ne \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. BM\u2019nin Somali’deki kuvvetlerine g\u0131da sa\u011flamak i\u00e7in birka\u00e7 teklif verdikten ve ba\u015fkent Mogadi\u015fu’daki ticaret merkezinde konu\u015fland\u0131ktan sonra buradaki faaliyetleri birka\u00e7 alan\u0131 i\u00e7erecek \u015fekilde geni\u015flemi\u015ftir. Bunlardan en \u00f6nemlisi: Tuzlu su ar\u0131nd\u0131rma, hayvan ihracat\u0131 ve g\u0131da tedarik zincirleridir.<\/strong> Morse, Nisan 1995’te silahl\u0131 unsurlar taraf\u0131ndan \u00f6ld\u00fcr\u00fclm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr.[7]<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

\u00c7at\u0131\u015fma taraflar\u0131n\u0131 destekleme stratejisi kapsam\u0131nda \u0130srail Aral\u0131k 1992’de Addis Ababa’da, Somali’ye \u0130nsani Yard\u0131m Koordinasyonu sa\u011flamak i\u00e7in \u0130kinci Uluslararas\u0131 Konferans’a kat\u0131larak Somalili silahl\u0131 gruplar\u0131n liderleriyle ili\u015fkiler kurmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u0130srail’in kendisine sad\u0131k unsurlar olu\u015fturmak amac\u0131yla Somalili isyanc\u0131 gruplar\u0131n liderleriyle temas kurma giri\u015fimleri, Etiyopya \u00fczerinden do\u011frudan veya dolayl\u0131 olarak devam etti. Bunun sonucunda, baz\u0131 Somalili gruplar \u015eubat 2001’de \u0130srail h\u00fck\u00fcmetine kontrolleri alt\u0131ndaki havalimanlar\u0131n\u0131n kullan\u0131m\u0131 konusunda yard\u0131mc\u0131 olabileceklerini s\u00f6ylediler. Bu teklifin sahne arkas\u0131nda Etiyopya’da bu fraksiyonlar\u0131n baz\u0131 liderleri ile bir Knesset \u00fcyesi aras\u0131nda konuyu tart\u0131\u015fmak i\u00e7in bir toplant\u0131 d\u00fczenlenmi\u015ftir.[8]<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Aral\u0131k 2006’da Somali’nin Etiyopya-Amerika taraf\u0131ndan i\u015fgali s\u0131ras\u0131nda \u0130srail, i\u015fgalci Etiyopya ordusunu destekleyerek \u0130slami Mahkemelerin otoritesini bozmada rol oynam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. \u0130\u015fgalden sonra Voice of Israel’in yay\u0131nlad\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir rapora g\u00f6re Fala\u015fa Yahudileri k\u00f6k\u00fcnden gelen \u0130srail ordusu, Mahkemelere kar\u015f\u0131 sava\u015fa kat\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Ayr\u0131ca baz\u0131 Somalili Yahudilerin Falashmura ile i\u015fbirli\u011fi i\u00e7inde \u0130srail h\u00fck\u00fcmetini Somali’deki Etiyopyal\u0131 i\u015fgal g\u00fc\u00e7lerine yard\u0131m etmeye ve para ve te\u00e7hizat sa\u011flamaya te\u015fvik etmek i\u00e7in mali ba\u011f\u0131\u015flar toplad\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 da belirtti. Mahkemelere kar\u015f\u0131 durmay\u0131 gerekli g\u00f6r\u00fcyorlard\u0131 \u00e7\u00fcnk\u00fc onlar\u0131n zaferi sonucunda Somali’deki Yahudi cemaatinin haklar\u0131n\u0131n elinden al\u0131naca\u011f\u0131na ve “kutsal topraklar\u0131na sahip olma haklar\u0131n\u0131n tehlikeye at\u0131laca\u011f\u0131na” inan\u0131yorlard\u0131. [9]<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Son d\u00f6nemlerde \u0130srail, Afrika k\u0131tas\u0131ndaki ve \u00f6zellikle de Afrika Boynuzu\u2019ndaki \u00e7e\u015fitli \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131na bir tehdit haline geldi\u011fi i\u00e7in Al-Shabaab ile m\u00fccadele etmek amac\u0131yla b\u00f6lgesel bir g\u00fcvenlik ittifak\u0131 kurmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131. \u0130srail Ba\u015fbakan\u0131 Benjamin 29 \u015eubat 2016’da Knesset’te “Afrika-\u0130srail Lobisi\u2019nin\u201d kuruldu\u011funu duyurdu\u011fu t\u00f6rende, herhangi bir Afrika \u00fclkesini tehdit edecek “\u0130slami Militanl\u0131k ve Ter\u00f6rizm” kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda g\u00fcvenlik i\u015fbirli\u011finin \u00f6nemini vurgulam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Yine \u0130srail’in “\u0130slami a\u015f\u0131r\u0131l\u0131k\u00e7\u0131lar\u0131n g\u00fc\u00e7leriyle sava\u015fmak” i\u00e7in Afrika ile ili\u015fkilerini – g\u00fcvenlik d\u00fczeyinde – g\u00fc\u00e7lendirmekle ilgilendi\u011fini s\u00f6yleyerek \u00f6zellikle bu konudaki uzmanl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 bu \u00fclkelere aktarmaya ve Do\u011fu Afrika \u00fclkeleriyle i\u015fbirli\u011fi yapmaya haz\u0131r oldu\u011funu duyurmu\u015ftur.[10]<\/a>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u0130srail ve Somaliland Cumhuriyeti<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Somaliland B\u00f6lgesi May\u0131s 1991’de Somali’den ayr\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 duyurdu ve Abd\u0131rahman Ahmad Ali Tur Somaliland Cumhuriyeti’nin ilk cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131 se\u00e7ildi.<\/strong>[<\/strong>11]<\/a> Y\u00f6netimi s\u0131ras\u0131nda b\u00f6lgede \u0130srail ile herhangi bir ba\u011f\u0131 yoktu.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

1993’de Iqal, Somaliland Cumhuriyeti’nin cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131 se\u00e7ilmesinin ard\u0131ndan \u0130srail Ba\u015fbakan\u0131 Yitzhak Rabin’e 3 Temmuz 1995’te \u0130slami k\u00f6ktendincili\u011fe kar\u015f\u0131 \u0130srail ile stratejik bir anla\u015fma talep eden bir mektup g\u00f6nderdi ve Somaliland halk\u0131n\u0131n %98’inin M\u00fcsl\u00fcman olmas\u0131na ra\u011fmen, \u0130slami h\u00fck\u00fcmleri uygulama niyetinde olmad\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 s\u00f6zlerine ekledi.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u0130srail’den askeri te\u00e7hizat ve uzmanlar\u0131n yan\u0131nda, 1996 sonunda Cumhuriyet Anayasas\u0131\u2019yla ilgili referandumu izlemeleri i\u00e7in g\u00f6zlemciler g\u00f6ndermesi ve Somaliland Cumhuriyeti’ne yard\u0131m sa\u011flamas\u0131n\u0131 talep etti.[12]<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Bunlar\u0131n bir sonucu olarak \u0130srail-Somaliland ili\u015fkisi Kas\u0131m 2001’de, \u0130srail\u2019in Somaliland’a askeri yard\u0131m sa\u011flamas\u0131n\u0131 ve personelini e\u011fitmesini i\u00e7eren bir anla\u015fman\u0131n Muhammed Iqal taraf\u0131ndan imzalanmas\u0131yla yeni bir boyut kazand\u0131.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Bu ba\u011flamda Musa Bihi’nin mevcut h\u00fck\u00fcmeti, BAE ile \u0130srail aras\u0131nda ger\u00e7ekle\u015fen normalle\u015fme anla\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131 memnuniyetle kar\u015f\u0131lam\u0131\u015f, Kenya’daki Somaliland B\u00fcy\u00fckel\u00e7isi anla\u015fman\u0131n b\u00f6lgede bar\u0131\u015f getirece\u011fini duyurmu\u015ftur.[13]<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

\u0130srail’in K\u0131z\u0131ldeniz’in G\u00fcney kap\u0131s\u0131 olan Bab al-Mandab Bo\u011faz\u0131’n\u0131 kontrol etmeyi hedeflemesi muhtemeldir. Bu koridorun izlenmesi, kuzeyden, \u00f6zellikle S\u00fcvey\u015f Kanal\u0131’ndan gelen seyr\u00fcsefer hareketini engelleyebilmek anlam\u0131na geldi\u011finden buraya askeri bir \u00fcs kurmak ve Berbera liman\u0131na denizalt\u0131lar yerle\u015ftirmek i\u00e7in yat\u0131r\u0131mlar yap\u0131yor. Bu da Somaliland’da \u0130srail askeri varl\u0131\u011f\u0131 yaratma giri\u015fimi anlam\u0131na geliyor.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Normalle\u015fme Giri\u015fimleri<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\u0130srail’in Somaliland’\u0131 tan\u0131maya haz\u0131r oldu\u011funa dair a\u00e7\u0131klamas\u0131, Mogadi\u015fu’daki Somali h\u00fck\u00fcmetine \u0130srail\u2019le ili\u015fkilerini normalle\u015ftirmesi i\u00e7in bask\u0131 yapma giri\u015fimleri olarak anla\u015f\u0131labilir. Belki de Mogadi\u015fu yava\u015f da olsa bu hedefin fark\u0131na vard\u0131 ve \u0130srail ile tam bir gizlilik i\u00e7inde ileti\u015fim kanallar\u0131 a\u00e7maya ba\u015flad\u0131. Bu, iki \u00fclkeden resmi yetkililer aras\u0131nda yap\u0131lan – d\u00fc\u015f\u00fck d\u00fczeyde de olsa \u2013 ilk toplant\u0131da netle\u015fti. Aral\u0131k 2015’te g\u00fcndemiyle ilgili yeterli bilginin olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 bu g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelere \u0130srail Maliye Bakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 temsilcileri ve Somali h\u00fck\u00fcmet yetkilileri de kat\u0131ld\u0131. Daha sonra Somalili ve \u0130srailli partileri bir araya getiren bir toplant\u0131 daha yap\u0131ld\u0131. \u0130ki parti taleplerini birbirine sunsa da bu toplant\u0131n\u0131n daha ger\u00e7ek\u00e7i ve daha \u00f6nemli di\u011fer toplant\u0131lar i\u00e7in bir \u00f6n g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fme olarak de\u011ferlendiriliyor. Bu g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeden alt\u0131 ay sonra, \u0130srailli kaynaklar 2016 y\u0131l\u0131n\u0131n haziran ay\u0131nda \u0130srail’de Ba\u015fbakan Benjamin Netanyahu ile eski Somali Cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131 Hasan \u015eeyh Mahmud<\/strong> – iktidardayken – ve di\u011fer \u00fc\u00e7 Somalili yetkili aras\u0131nda \u00fcst d\u00fczey bir g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fme yap\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 bildirmi\u015ftir.[14]<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Toplant\u0131n\u0131n haberi, Netanyahu’nun Temmuz 2016 ba\u015f\u0131nda Nil Havzas\u0131 ve Afrika Boynuzu b\u00f6lgelerine yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 ziyaretler s\u0131ras\u0131nda s\u0131zd\u0131r\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Buna kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131k Somali D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 b\u00f6yle bir toplant\u0131n\u0131n yap\u0131lmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 s\u00f6ylemi\u015f ve ard\u0131ndan s\u00f6z\u00fc h\u00fck\u00fcmetin m\u00fcttefik veya kom\u015fu \u00fclkelerle ili\u015fkiler kurmas\u0131n\u0131n normal oldu\u011funa getirmi\u015ftir. Neticede Cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131 Hasan \u015eeyh’in \u00e7\u0131karlara dayal\u0131, b\u00f6lgesel ve uluslararas\u0131 kutuplar aras\u0131nda denge politikas\u0131 g\u00f6z \u00f6n\u00fcne al\u0131nd\u0131\u011f\u0131nda bu haber do\u011fru olabilir.[15]<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

T\u00fcm bunlar \u0130srail ziyaretinin tamamen pragmatik bir \u00e7er\u00e7evede yorumlanabilece\u011fini g\u00f6steriyor. Belki de, \u0130srail ile Washington \u00fczerinden daha iyi ba\u011flar\u0131n kurulmas\u0131n\u0131n Somali lehine bir etkisi olabilece\u011fi inanc\u0131na ek olarak \u0130srail’in Somaliland’\u0131 tan\u0131mas\u0131na giden yolun kesilmesi hedefleniyordu. Selefinden farkl\u0131 olarak mevcut Somali Devlet Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Muhammed Abdullah Farmajo<\/strong>‘nun \u0130srail’e y\u00f6nelik politikas\u0131 – \u015fimdiye kadar – onunla k\u0131yasa yer b\u0131rakmayacak \u015fekilde kategorik g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcyor ve bu politikan\u0131n ilk g\u00f6stergesi Netanyahu ve Kenya Cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131\u2019n\u0131n g\u00f6reve ba\u015flama t\u00f6renine kat\u0131lan baz\u0131 Afrikal\u0131 liderlerin dahil oldu\u011fu bir toplant\u0131ya kat\u0131lmay\u0131 reddetmesiydi.[16]<\/a>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u0130srail, Somali’yi Somaliland’\u0131 tan\u0131makla tehdit ederek ve Somaliland’\u0131n da d\u0131\u015f d\u00fcnyayla ileti\u015fim kurma ihtiyac\u0131n\u0131 istismar ederek bu \u00fclkeleri onunla normalle\u015fmeye zorluyor ve \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131 korumak i\u00e7in bu \u00fclkelerde sa\u011flam bir konum elde etmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131yor. Bu s\u00fcre\u00e7te Suudi Arabistan veya Etiyopya gibi \u00fclkelerin Somali’ye normalle\u015fme i\u00e7in bask\u0131 uygulay\u0131p uygulamayaca\u011f\u0131 sorusu akla geliyor. D\u0131\u015f g\u00fc\u00e7lerin bask\u0131s\u0131 Somali’yi \u0130srail ile normalle\u015fmeye y\u00f6nlendirmeye ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 olursa, bu normalle\u015fme Al-Shabaab ile \u00e7at\u0131\u015fman\u0131n uzamas\u0131na neden olacak m\u0131? Sonu\u00e7ta Somali h\u00fck\u00fcmetinin \u0130srail’e d\u00fc\u015fman olan \u00f6rg\u00fctlerin tepkisine ne \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde haz\u0131r oldu\u011fu ve normalle\u015fmeye kar\u015f\u0131 olan halk\u0131n arzusunu ne \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde takdir edebildi\u011fi d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fclmelidir.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n

[1]<\/a> Carol, Steven: Israel’s Foreign Policy towards East Africa, Ph.D. Dissertation,St. John’s University, New York, 1977, P. 38.<\/span><\/p>\n

[2]<\/a>Carol, Steven: Israel’s Foreign Policy towards East Africa, Ph.D. Dissertation,St. John’s University, New York, 1977, P. 38.<\/span><\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> Emel Al-Shazly: Afrika Boynundaki Uluslararas\u0131 H\u0131rslar, Politika, Say\u0131 (54), Ekim 1978, s. 53.<\/span><\/p>\n

[4]<\/a>Gorman, Robert: Political Conflict on The Horn of Africa, Praeger, New York, 1981, P. 137.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

[5]<\/a> Sami Sabri Abd al-Qawi, \u0130srail ve Somali, penetrasyon ve normalle\u015fme giri\u015fimleri aras\u0131nda, raporlar ve analizlerAfrican okumalar\u0131 sitesi.<\/span><\/p>\n

[6]<\/a> Al-Moez Farouk Muhammad: Israel and the Strategic Conflict in the Horn of Africa, Sudan Currency Limited Press, Hartum, 2010, s. 375-376.<\/span><\/p>\n

[7]<\/a> Al-Amin Abdel-Razek Adam: Foreign Interventions and Their Impact on Stability in Somali (1991-2002), Khartoum, 2006, s. 221-223.<\/span><\/p>\n

[8]<\/a> Ghada Mohamed Ahmed Zayan: 11 Eyl\u00fcl 2001 olaylar\u0131ndan sonra Afrika Boynuzu’na y\u00f6nelik \u0130srail d\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131, yay\u0131nlanmam\u0131\u015f bir y\u00fcksek lisans tezi, Kahire \u00dcniversitesi Ekonomi ve Siyaset Bilimi Fak\u00fcltesi, Kahire, 2014, s.124.<\/span><\/p>\n

[9]<\/a> Muhammad Sharif Mahmoud: The Sionist Role in the Horn of Africa Conflict, Al-Quds Al-Arabi Gazetesi, 13 \u015eubat 2008.<\/span><\/p>\n

[10]<\/a> \u0130srail ve Afrika aras\u0131ndaki zorluklar ve f\u0131rsatlar, \u0130srail D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 web sitesi, 29 \u015eubat 2016, \u015fu adresten: http:\/\/mfa.gov.il\/MFAAR\/TheGovernment\/Pages\/Africa_Israel_relations.aspx<\/span><\/p>\n

[11]<\/a> http:\/\/somaliwiki.com\/index.php\/2017\/03\/26\/cabdiraxman-axmed-cali-tuur\/<\/span><\/p>\n

[12]<\/a> Al-\u00c2min Abdel-Razek Adam: Foreign Interventions and Their Impact on Stability in Somali (1991-2002), Khartoum, sf.223.<\/span><\/p>\n

[13]<\/a> https:\/\/somalilandtoday.com\/2020\/08\/18\/somaliland-oo-ku-biirtay-dawladaha-soo-dhaweeyay-heshiiska-israaiil-iyo-imaaraadka-carabta\/<\/span><\/p>\n

[14]<\/a> Raphael Ahren: Somali cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131 ge\u00e7ti\u011fimiz g\u00fcnlerde bir \u0130srail ba\u015fbakan\u0131yla ilk tarihi toplant\u0131y\u0131 ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirdi, The Times of Israel web sitesi, 5 Temmuz 2016, \u015fu adreste: http:\/\/ar.timesofisrael.com<\/span><\/p>\n

[15]<\/a> \u00a0\u0130brahim Abd el-Kadir Muhammed: Somali ve \u0130srail liderleri aras\u0131ndaki iddia edilen toplant\u0131ya dair g\u00f6stergeler, Somali Times web sitesi, 8 Temmuz 2016, http:\/\/www.somalitimes.net<\/span><\/p>\n

[16]<\/a> \u00a0\u0130srail Somali’nin kap\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131 \u00e7al\u0131yor Mogadi\u015fu Ara\u015ft\u0131rma ve Ara\u015ft\u0131rma Merkezi web sitesi, 30 Kas\u0131m 2017, http:\/\/mogadishucenter.com<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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